Julia Gillard has been having an awful time in politics because of the carbon tax. She's been roundly criticised for stating during the election that it was not on the table, then backflipping the moment she became PM (this is not an isolated case, of course). The opposition really lay into her for that. Then there's the fact that it is mathematically certain that a) the carbon tax will have no direct measurable effect on global temperatures even if in theory it did reduce overall carbon dioxide emissions and carbon dioxide is a major problem and global temperature rises are a major issue, and b) it will further hollow out the already nearly dead industrial base in Australia. Point a means that it will never be possible to tell from the global temperature measurement whether the carbon tax has had the desired effect. Point b means that production currently happening in Australia will almost certainly move to other countries where the power is cheaper and dirtier, so the nett effect will be to increase over all carbon dioxide emissions in accordance with the well-known Law of Unintended Consequences.
Given the furore and the heavy hits she's taken in the polls, and the fact that she's still the Labor leader, I have speculated in the past that it may be due to pressure from the UN that this is happening at all. It is well known that Labor and the Greens are in cahoots, especially given the fact that the Labor government is a minority government, but to me that did not seem like enough reason to waste all the Labor party's political capital in this way. UN countries really hate it when some people become too wealthy, and a carbon tax is an ideal way to really scupper a country's productive capacity and make its people poorer. Thus it's possible the UN wanted to cut us down to size. If Gillard gets a job at the UN, World Bank, IMF or ITO in the near future we'll know beyond a reasonable doubt, but in the mean time there is another issue that has come up.
Recently ol' Julia has been criticising the states for the extreme rise in electricity prices, and threatening that if prices don't come down the Federal Government will act to force them down. For anyone familiar with economics this should be ringing alarm bells the size of planets. A few of the questions that might be raised are:
If prices genuinely are too high, why isn't the "market competition" that's been introduced in recent years driving down the prices?
If prices are simply the response to carbon taxes, won't a plan to force them down cause shortages?
Why didn't the energy futures market provide a better buffer to the power prices?
This threat from the Federal Government got me thinking about who is benefiting from this whole thing. In politics one should always look for where the money is. The people who asked for a given piece of legislation are usually the ones who benefit from it, this is merely common sense.
One group that might benefit from this bill is producers of "green" power and the manufacturers of the technology used in its production (mostly windmills). Of course, it's mostly the foreign manufacturers of the technology are helped because CO2 inducing electricity must be used in the types of heavy manufacture that producers of green power technology employ.
Another group that could conceivably benefit is the Federal Government itself. This could well be some type of power grab to seize control of all of Australia's power infrastructure from the states. Another obvious benefit is the potential for greater tax takes and indirect control of the energy producers themselves who will be only too happy to beg and roll over if the Federal Government threatens to raise taxes.
The third group I can think of that might benefit is unionised and or skilled labour. Expensive energy makes capital intensive processes more expensive and will increase the over-all demand for labour. This, in turn, will drive up the price of labour, especially of skilled labour of the type that can stand in for capital goods. Along with the controls over entry into the skilled labour market due to barriers to entry, licensing, compulsory unionisation and a number of other regulations this could well have a significant effect on the price of skilled labour, which will of course have a negative impact on the general welfare and particularly on the poor.
Now, I know that any minute now you expect me to reach for my tinfoil hat. Why so conspiratorial? you might well ask. We have learned the hard way that in a democracy politicians are still only doing what will get them more votes, money and power. I think I've outlined a credible case of how those three objectives might be served by this bill. The policy is merely a continuation of the fundamentally fascist way public affairs and "public good" businesses have been conducted in Australia for some time, and most especially since the acceleration of privatisation during the Howard government.
I believe this attack by Gillard on the states is an extremely worrying sign, another expression of the economic fallacy that if a small group of monopolists are doing a bad job the solution is to create a single monopoly. Time will tell if it will materialise into a fully-fledged takeover of the power grid by the Federal Government but I wouldn't be the slightest bit surprised if that were the endgame.
Showing posts with label market. Show all posts
Showing posts with label market. Show all posts
Monday, 20 August 2012
Why the carbon tax?
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Sunday, 7 August 2011
Boom and Bust
Anyone unfortunate enough to stumble across my blog may be led to believe that I have no time or inclination for writing - after all, if I did there would be more posts, wouldn't there? The truth is rather different - I find it hard to choose what to write about, because it seems there are so many topics that urgently require my inspection. As a result I may make extensive notes about an idea and then never use it. It is a fact that I have fairly recently returned my appetite for knowledge so I must be a nett consumer of information if I am to get anywhere with anything. Hopefully I can return the fruits of my investigations to whoever is willing to read.
Lately I've been bending my will towards understanding economics. It seems that he field is muddy even to the experts, and assumptions and pitfalls abound. The 2008 crash showed that the banks didn't really know what they were doing, and before the crisis everyone thought the world was hunky-dory, so no-one else knew either, except a few like this guy. In fact I would hazard a guess that no one really knows what causes things like inflation, bubbles, deflation, crashes and the like. All we know is that generally if we put pressure on point x we get a response y. Thus when a country's official interest rate is lowered, inflation increases, and vice versa.
Most of today's economy seems to revolve around investors, in one way or another. The thinking is that no investor will willingly throw money away by buying into a bad deal, but the crash of 2008 showed this belief to be a fantasy. Governments can borrow money because investors are willing to give it to them - if they expect a return. Currencies are strengthen or weaken depending on how much faith investors have that the currency will stay strong or will weaken further. Companies can borrow money if banks think they will get a nett return, same for individuals. Investors bank money if they think the bank's practices are lucrative.
It does not take long to realise that this whole thing is a positive feedback loop. It all works if people are confident, but it rapidly goes down the toilet if people lose confidence. Granted this is a simplification but let's work with it for a moment. What are the checks? Where is the point where investment confidence is lost? Where is it gained? This article lists some of the causes and effects of four major crashes over the last century or so. They all have in common the formation of a "bubble" leading up to the crash. The first three have new rules associated with them that were intended to prevent future crashes. All of them failed. The Economists apparently ran out of talent, too, because no additional rules or institutions have resulted from the most recent crash, in order to prevent such a thing happening again. Instead we had costly bailouts, humiliatingly paid for by countries we might consider backward - China and the oil nations of the Middle East. In fact China is now the US's biggest creditor. The crashes we have suffered were either necessary, or they should direct us to restructure our finance. No one is claiming they were necessary and the Arab world laughed at us, saying their financial structures were more robust. So have we changed the way we do business? I should coco.
You may think I am having a downer on investors - after all, they are the link in the chain that has the most influence on the positive feedback - but I'm not, really. They are part of the problem but they are not the problem. The real problem is the way we do business. This article and the comments it sparked have some very interesting views, and suggest some solutions that are presently beyond me. It suggests that financial engineers are to blame for the crash, and to an extent they may be, but what is it about the system that makes financial engineering a tempting prospect in the first place? Why do bubbles form at all?
The answers to those questions are by no means obvious, and there is debate among economists on the answers. There are some things we can say with a reasonable degree of conviction, though. Firstly both the bubble and the crash are in principle based on investor psychology. It doesn't seem possible to identify one particular cause, instead a range of factors come into play.
A bubble is a type of inflation, except that in the real world if inflation causes a rise in the cost of, say, electricity, each kWh still has a genuine worth based on the production and distribution cost. Its worth is anchored in the work required to create it and get it into your house, or factory, or whatever. Of course demand can increase its price, but ultimately its worth can never go much above the economic benefit it gives to the buyer. Stocks, too, are subject to supply and demand. When a company is goes public its apparent worth is divided among stocks or shares, giving each of those shares a value that is defined by the total value of the company. The money raised from this partial sale is used to further the business. Over time the stocks of the company increase or decrease in value as investors buy or sell depending on whether they believe the company is growing or shrinking. Bad news, such as under-target profits, tend to depress the value of stock, and vice versa. But ultimately the real-terms value of stock is not known, it is only inferred from the company's past performance, market conditions and the company's current performance. So if investors suddenly believed that a company was going down the tubes they might sell all the public stock back to the company, resulting in a price drop that might make going down the tubes inevitable. A self-fulfilling prophecy. There is no anchor for the value of stocks, they are worth exactly what investors think they are worth. This becomes a problem when investors' beliefs are based on the beliefs of other investors. This was illustrated nicely when the dotcom bubble ocurred. Investors were so confident in the new business model that they thought such companies were worth more than their real value, resulting in a runaway investment boom that ended when everybody realised it was chaff. Some people legally made shed loads of cash by taking advantage of the investors' credulity. There is a word for such people. It is "conman". More can be found here. Similarly the bubble bursts when investors realise the bubble can no longer be sustained and opt out. A "correction" results, which, if the number of investors in the bubble is large enough, can become a crash, as investors with no exit strategy panic and sell as fast as possible to avoid heavy losses.
The model allows for rapid increases in stock prices, thus growing a company very fast, which can be a good thing, for sure, but this very volatility also gives rise to the possibility of a massive crash, resulting in a company losing value, likely ending up being undervalued. Instability is inherent in the system, so we either have to accept that crashes will occur and hope that the times of plenty make up for them, or we have to design a new system where stock valuations are not so volatile.
Lately I've been bending my will towards understanding economics. It seems that he field is muddy even to the experts, and assumptions and pitfalls abound. The 2008 crash showed that the banks didn't really know what they were doing, and before the crisis everyone thought the world was hunky-dory, so no-one else knew either, except a few like this guy. In fact I would hazard a guess that no one really knows what causes things like inflation, bubbles, deflation, crashes and the like. All we know is that generally if we put pressure on point x we get a response y. Thus when a country's official interest rate is lowered, inflation increases, and vice versa.
Most of today's economy seems to revolve around investors, in one way or another. The thinking is that no investor will willingly throw money away by buying into a bad deal, but the crash of 2008 showed this belief to be a fantasy. Governments can borrow money because investors are willing to give it to them - if they expect a return. Currencies are strengthen or weaken depending on how much faith investors have that the currency will stay strong or will weaken further. Companies can borrow money if banks think they will get a nett return, same for individuals. Investors bank money if they think the bank's practices are lucrative.
It does not take long to realise that this whole thing is a positive feedback loop. It all works if people are confident, but it rapidly goes down the toilet if people lose confidence. Granted this is a simplification but let's work with it for a moment. What are the checks? Where is the point where investment confidence is lost? Where is it gained? This article lists some of the causes and effects of four major crashes over the last century or so. They all have in common the formation of a "bubble" leading up to the crash. The first three have new rules associated with them that were intended to prevent future crashes. All of them failed. The Economists apparently ran out of talent, too, because no additional rules or institutions have resulted from the most recent crash, in order to prevent such a thing happening again. Instead we had costly bailouts, humiliatingly paid for by countries we might consider backward - China and the oil nations of the Middle East. In fact China is now the US's biggest creditor. The crashes we have suffered were either necessary, or they should direct us to restructure our finance. No one is claiming they were necessary and the Arab world laughed at us, saying their financial structures were more robust. So have we changed the way we do business? I should coco.
You may think I am having a downer on investors - after all, they are the link in the chain that has the most influence on the positive feedback - but I'm not, really. They are part of the problem but they are not the problem. The real problem is the way we do business. This article and the comments it sparked have some very interesting views, and suggest some solutions that are presently beyond me. It suggests that financial engineers are to blame for the crash, and to an extent they may be, but what is it about the system that makes financial engineering a tempting prospect in the first place? Why do bubbles form at all?
The answers to those questions are by no means obvious, and there is debate among economists on the answers. There are some things we can say with a reasonable degree of conviction, though. Firstly both the bubble and the crash are in principle based on investor psychology. It doesn't seem possible to identify one particular cause, instead a range of factors come into play.
A bubble is a type of inflation, except that in the real world if inflation causes a rise in the cost of, say, electricity, each kWh still has a genuine worth based on the production and distribution cost. Its worth is anchored in the work required to create it and get it into your house, or factory, or whatever. Of course demand can increase its price, but ultimately its worth can never go much above the economic benefit it gives to the buyer. Stocks, too, are subject to supply and demand. When a company is goes public its apparent worth is divided among stocks or shares, giving each of those shares a value that is defined by the total value of the company. The money raised from this partial sale is used to further the business. Over time the stocks of the company increase or decrease in value as investors buy or sell depending on whether they believe the company is growing or shrinking. Bad news, such as under-target profits, tend to depress the value of stock, and vice versa. But ultimately the real-terms value of stock is not known, it is only inferred from the company's past performance, market conditions and the company's current performance. So if investors suddenly believed that a company was going down the tubes they might sell all the public stock back to the company, resulting in a price drop that might make going down the tubes inevitable. A self-fulfilling prophecy. There is no anchor for the value of stocks, they are worth exactly what investors think they are worth. This becomes a problem when investors' beliefs are based on the beliefs of other investors. This was illustrated nicely when the dotcom bubble ocurred. Investors were so confident in the new business model that they thought such companies were worth more than their real value, resulting in a runaway investment boom that ended when everybody realised it was chaff. Some people legally made shed loads of cash by taking advantage of the investors' credulity. There is a word for such people. It is "conman". More can be found here. Similarly the bubble bursts when investors realise the bubble can no longer be sustained and opt out. A "correction" results, which, if the number of investors in the bubble is large enough, can become a crash, as investors with no exit strategy panic and sell as fast as possible to avoid heavy losses.
The model allows for rapid increases in stock prices, thus growing a company very fast, which can be a good thing, for sure, but this very volatility also gives rise to the possibility of a massive crash, resulting in a company losing value, likely ending up being undervalued. Instability is inherent in the system, so we either have to accept that crashes will occur and hope that the times of plenty make up for them, or we have to design a new system where stock valuations are not so volatile.
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